Orbital Debris: Out of Space by Plantz, Meghan R
  
585 
ORBITAL DEBRIS: OUT OF SPACE 
Meghan R. Plantz∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 586 
II. THE ORBITAL DEBRIS PROBLEM ..................................................... 590 
A. Popular Orbits .......................................................................... 590 
B. Orbital Debris .......................................................................... 592 
C. The Current Space Environment and Orbital Debris ............... 594 
D. The Risks Associated with Orbital Debris ................................ 595 
E. The Future of the Space Environment ...................................... 596 
F. Current Scientific Solutions...................................................... 597 
III. THE STAGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION: THE CASE FOR 
REMEDIATION ................................................................................. 600 
IV. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW ......................................... 601 
A. Binding International Treaties ................................................. 602 
1. The Outer Space Treaty ..................................................... 602 
2. Liability Convention .......................................................... 605 
B. Non-Binding International Policies ......................................... 606 
V. PROPOSALS FOR A NEW LEGAL REGIME ......................................... 608 
A. A New International Treaty ...................................................... 608 
B. Customary International Law .................................................. 609 
C. Reforming the Liability Convention ......................................... 610 
D. Compensation or Liability Fund .............................................. 610 
E. Market-Share Liability ............................................................. 611 
VI. MARKET POWER AND A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT .................. 613 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 618 
                                                                                                                   
 ∗  J.D., University of Georgia, 2012; B.A., Ohio University, 2007.  
586  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:585 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As of 2010, there are more than 21,000 documented objects in space, 
exceeding ten centimeters in size.1  In 1995, estimates suggested that only 
5% of the cataloged objects were operational spacecraft, making the 
remaining 95% orbital debris.2  In 1983, a .02 millimeter paint fleck collided 
with the Challenger space shuttle.3  Fortunately, it only cracked the 
windshield but still had a replacement cost of $50,000 U.S. dollars.4  In 
1996, a fragment of a Chinese rocket that remained in space ten years after a 
collision between Chinese and U.S. rockets struck a French microsatellite 
causing substantial damage and requiring an expensive recovery operation.5  
These examples are just a sampling of instances where orbital debris caused 
significant and costly damage.  Despite attempts to identify debris found in 
space, a large amount has yet to be catalogued as it continues to be created.  
For instance, in February 2009, an active U.S. satellite and an inactive 
Russian satellite collided and generated more than 2,000 pieces of debris, of 
which only about 1,740 have been identified and catalogued.6  The orbital 
debris problem also threatens Earth when orbital debris enters the Earth’s 
atmosphere and crashes into the land or water below.  In 1991, fragments 
from the U.S.S.R.’s Salyut 7 space station unexpectedly reentered the Earth’s 
atmosphere and landed in unpopulated areas of Argentina.7  Six years later in 
1997, parts of a U.S. launch vehicle, including a 450 pound stainless steel 
propellant tank, ruptured upon impact close to a farmer’s house in 
Georgetown, Texas. Other parts from the launch vehicle landed around 
Texas and Oklahoma, such as the titanium helium-pressurized sphere that 
landed 100 miles away in Seguin, Texas.8   
                                                                                                                   
 1 SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2011, at 28–29 (Cesar Jaramillo ed., 2011), 
available at http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2011.revised.pdf.   
 2 OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERAGENCY REPORT ON 
ORBITAL DEBRIS 11 (1995), available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/IAR_95_Docu 
ment.pdf [hereinafter INTERAGENCY REPORT]. 
 3 Id. at 13. 
 4 Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of Space Debris, 40 
AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 640 (2003). 
 5 MARK WILLIAMSON, SPACE: THE FRAGILE FRONTIER 66 (2006). 
 6 Update on Three Major Debris Clouds, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2010, at 4, 
available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i2.pdf (explaining that 
the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tracks and catalogues objects in space, and 
therefore, provided this data). 
 7 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 74.   
 8 Id. (noting that a launch vehicle is a rocket that reaches a desired orbit and then launches 
a satellite); Russell P. Patera & William H. Ailor, The Realities of Reentry Disposal, in 99 
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Orbital debris poses a threat to life and property, both in space and upon 
its reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere.9  As the presence in space becomes 
more proliferate among nations, the amount of resulting orbital debris 
likewise increases.  For those reasons, a global solution to the orbital debris 
problem must be developed and implemented before a catastrophic event 
causes irreparable harm.10    
In 1957, in response to the U.S.S.R. successfully launching Sputnik, the 
world’s first man-made satellite, the international community raced to draft 
laws to regulate space.11  Four treaties were drafted addressing space law:  
(1) the Outer Space Treaty, (2) the Liability Convention, (3) the Registration 
Convention, and (4) the Rescue and Return Agreement.12  Since the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. were the only states with the technology to reach space at the 
time these treaties were adopted, space law drafters failed to provide for a 
world where multiple states would have space capabilities, either through 
their government or private industry.13  Despite the four international treaties 
listed above, and those discussed below, the international legal regime 
governing space is insufficient to meet modern space demands and remedy 
current issues, including the urgent orbital debris problem.14   
In 2008, the United Nations developed and adopted the Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space.15  These Guidelines provide measures to be incorporated into space 
mission planning and spacecraft design with the aim of reducing mission-
related orbital debris.16  The Guidelines attempt to internationally standardize 
the safety level of engineering and technology on spacecraft, but are only 
                                                                                                                   
ADVANCES IN ASTRONAUTICAL SCIENCES 1059, 1067 (1998), available at http:/www.globalse 
curity.org/space/library/report/enviro/reentrypaper.pdf. 
 9 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 72–75. 
 10 LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT 
AND CHARTING THE FUTURE 18–19 (2008).   
 11 Brian Beck, The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the 
International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry, 
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (2009). 
 12 See sources cited infra notes 150–53. 
 13 Beck, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
 14 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 15 G.A. Res. 62/217, para. 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008).  “Mitigation refers 
to a class of actions designed to lessen the pain or reduce the severity of a problem.”  DAVE 
BAIOCCHI & WILLIAM WELSER IV, CONFRONTING SPACE DEBRIS: STRATEGIES AND WARNINGS 
FROM COMPARABLE EXAMPLES INCLUDING DEEPWATER HORIZON, at xv (2010). 
 16 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sci. & Tech. Subcomm., Inter-Agency 
Space Debris Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.1/L.260 (Nov. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Mitigation Guidelines]. 
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voluntary and lack sanctions for noncompliance.  As a result, most states fail 
to wholly comply with them.17  Furthermore, while the Mitigation Guidelines 
address the creation of orbital debris, they fail to address the removal of 
current orbital debris, a process known as “remediation of the space 
environment.”18   
Many theorists propose that the international community either update 
and enhance or change space law to specifically address the orbital debris 
problem.19  Current proposed theories suggest solutions such as providing (1) 
a direct financial incentive to states to reduce or eliminate debris, or (2) a 
requirement that forces state actors to compensate other states in the Space 
community for spacecraft or satellites damaged by unidentified debris.20  
Accordingly, the legal frameworks proposed to support and enforce these 
solutions include: (1) a new United Nation’s treaty, (2) a code of customary 
international law, (3) a reformed fault-based liability system, (4) a 
compensation or liability fund, and (5) a market-share liability system.21   
While these proposals attempt to assign fault and liability in orbital debris 
collisions, they fail to provide a practical long-term solution for the entire 
international space community.  Specifically, they rely on the philosophy 
that “past polluters pay.”  As such, these proposals assign the bulk of the bill 
to the U.S. and Russia, the predominant space players and polluters in the 
past.22  The U.S. and Russia will likely refuse any such payments and 
proposed regime changes because of the number of other space actors who 
now share the responsibility of maintaining and remediating the space 
environment.23  Without the support of the U.S. and Russia, any regime 
modification would be futile.  
As of 2011, sixty actors utilize the space environment, predominantly 
through the use of satellites.24  Ten actors have independent orbital launch 
capabilities25 and five regularly launch spacecraft belonging to other states 
                                                                                                                   
 17 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 18 BAIOCCHI & WESLER, supra note 15.  “Remediation refers to the act of applying a remedy 
in order to reverse events or stop undesired effects.” Id. 
 19 See discussion infra Part V. 
 20 See discussion infra Part V. 
 21 See discussion infra Part V. 
 22 See discussion infra Part V. 
 23 Michael W. Taylor, Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital 
Debris Problem, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 53 (2007). 
 24 SPACESECURITY.ORG, supra note 1, at 17.  Actor refers collectively to governments, 
organizations, and corporations. 
 25 Id. 
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lacking such capabilities,26 thus holding significant control and power over 
the space community.  Consequently, this controlling class of actors has the 
potential to wield effective market power in the space industry, given the 
substantial and prohibitive cost to non-launch capable states of establishing 
such capabilities.  Market power enables this class of actors to develop and 
impose a space regime that forces players in the space community to 
financially contribute to remediating and protecting the space environment 
and the impact of space activities on Earth.   
This Note argues that the class of states with launch capabilities needs to 
develop a multilateral agreement among themselves, with provisions for 
entry by new launch-capable states, to self-impose a launch fee system.  
Proceeds from this fee system will fund the research and development of 
remediation technology for the space environment, as well as the reduction 
of prospective orbital debris.  This multilateral agreement uses market power 
as a controlling means to regulate the space environment.  Every state that 
currently utilizes space, either with launch capabilities or by contracting for 
such capabilities, will contribute to the shared cost of preserving the space 
environment and benefit from the results of a cleaner and safer environment.  
Part II explains the current orbital debris situation, with a discussion of 
the nature of the space environment, the sources of orbital debris, the 
limitations on observing and tracking debris, and the estimated amount of 
orbital debris.  Part II provides a scientific analysis of the estimated damage 
to a spacecraft upon impact with a piece of orbital debris, as well as the 
likelihood of an orbital debris collision.  Additionally, Part II addresses the 
international community’s response to the orbital debris problem; 
specifically the scientific solutions to avoid the problem, such as shielding, 
tracking and avoidance maneuvers around debris, controlling re-entry of 
debris into the Earth’s atmosphere, and moving satellites into less congested 
orbits at the end of their mission life.  However, the current international 
response seeks only to avoid orbital debris collisions rather than actually 
remedy the fundamental problem. 
Part III explains why remediation should take place now rather than 
waiting for a catastrophic event to occur.  Part IV explains the current 
international laws pertaining to space.  Part V analyzes several proposed 
legal solutions and illustrates their respective flaws.  Finally, Part VI posits 
                                                                                                                   
 26 Independent orbital launch capability means a country indigenously has the technology 
and ability to reach orbital space.  The ten actors with independent orbital launch capability 
are Russia, the United States, China, France, the U.K., India, Japan, Israel, Iran, and the 
European Space Agency (ESA).  The five most active actors in the commercial launch 
industry are Russia, the ESA, the U.S., China, and India.  Id. at 99.  
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that the most effective solution to the orbital debris problem is a multilateral 
agreement between launch-capable states with market power in the space 
community to impose a launch fee system and create a global space 
remediation fund.   
II. THE ORBITAL DEBRIS PROBLEM 
Understanding the sources and problems of orbital debris requires a 
general understanding of the technical and scientific background of the space 
environment, as well as the sources and risks of orbital debris.  This Part 
describes the space environment, orbital debris, the current amount of orbital 
debris in space, the risks of orbital debris, the future of the space 
environment, and the current scientific solutions to the orbital debris 
problem. 
A.  Popular Orbits  
The most functional areas of space are the orbits closest to Earth.27  These 
orbits play host to a variety of satellites with differing functions, ranging 
from military operations, remote sensing, civil communications, meteorology 
research, and astronomy research.28  While there are four orbits around the 
Earth, the two most suitable orbits for satellite operations are the Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) and the Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO).29  Both orbits are 
very congested with satellites and contain most of the total mass of orbital 
debris.30   
LEO, the closest orbit to Earth, occupies the atmospheric space from an 
altitude of 100 kilometers above the Earth’s sea level to 1,000 kilometers 
above sea level.31  Due to the Earth’s strong gravitational force in LEO, 
satellites and spacecraft must travel at high speeds to stay in LEO.32  
Specifically, the average orbital velocity in LEO is approximately 17,000 
miles per hour (mph).33  Therefore, a complete rotation around the Earth only 
takes a satellite in LEO 100 minutes, and makes LEO particularly useful for 
                                                                                                                   
 27 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 32. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Taylor, supra note 23, at 5. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Natalie Pusey, The Case for Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response to the 
Space Debris Problem, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 425, 426 (2010). 
 32 What is Orbit?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features/what-is-o 
rbit-58.html (last updated July 7, 2010). 
 33 Id. 
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satellites that need to quickly view the entire Earth.34  The combination of 
LEO’s close proximity to the Earth and its quick orbit makes it the most 
demanded, and thus overcrowded, orbit in space.35  However, the congestion 
also makes LEO one of the most dangerous areas of space because there is a 
greater risk of collision.36  Depending on an object’s mass and surface area, 
its longevity in LEO ranges from a few years to a few hundred years.37  As 
such, orbital debris has the potential to remain trapped in LEO for a long 
time.  With more and more orbital debris being added every year, LEO is 
likely to become more dangerous unless a solution to orbital debris is found.   
The second most demanded earth orbit, GEO, occupies the atmospheric 
space 35,787 kilometers above sea level, centered over the Earth’s equator.38  
GEO is named Geostationary because, in this orbit, satellites rotate at the 
same speed as the Earth and therefore stay over an exact location on the 
Earth’s surface, such as a state.39  This allows satellites to maintain a 
constant visual over a specific location, unlike in LEO where satellites are 
moving around the Earth at a speed faster than the Earth’s rotation, only 
viewing a location for the time they are over it and then losing visual as they 
continue to rotate.40  GEO is slower and more controlled than LEO.  GEO 
has only nominal gravitational pull from the Earth; thus, satellites and orbital 
debris in GEO have anticipated orbital life spans in excess of one million 
years.41  Most communication satellites operate in GEO, because three 
satellites spanning the earth can provide complete communication 
coverage.42  Satellites in GEO do not have to be tracked since they are in a 
fixed location with minimal motion.  This makes the cost of operating 
satellites once they are in GEO lower than other orbits.43  However, satellite 
operators compete for preferential positions over certain densely populated 
regions, such as North America, which then create satellite clusters at these 
positions.44  The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an 
organization of the United Nations, manages the placement of geostationary 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Pusey, supra note 31, at 426–27. 
 35 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 35. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Pusey, supra note 31, at 427. 
 38 Id.  
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 426–27. 
 41 Id. at 427.  
 42 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 35. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Pusey, supra note 31, at 427. 
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objects, such as satellites.45  Every satellite operator must receive permission 
from the ITU for use of a specific satellite position.46   
LEO and GEO have a limited capacity with an increasing demand.  With 
the ever-increasing growth of technology that relies on satellite use, more 
and more countries are beginning to utilize space.  In 1957, only two 
countries, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., used space; by 2011, more than fifty 
countries had satellites in space.47  Increasing amounts of orbital debris, 
discussed below, coupled with the increasing amount of state actors using 
space, have put LEO and GEO in perilous conditions.  Both LEO and GEO 
have a fixed capacity and one day, without remediation of orbital debris, 
these orbits may reach their limits.  
B.  Orbital Debris  
Orbital debris has several aliases: space junk, space litter, space waste, or 
space refuse.  The United Nations defines orbital debris as “all man-made 
objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-
entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional.”48  Natural meteoroids 
differ from orbital debris in that they pass through the Earth’s orbital space, 
while orbital debris remains trapped in the Earth’s orbits.49   
Orbital debris is a matter of global concern for all nations. As the demand 
for and use of orbital space increases, due in part to advancing technology 
that requires satellite operations, the potential for orbital debris likewise 
increases.  The increasing accumulation of orbital debris directly correlates 
with the increasing risk of a debris collision with spacecraft.50  
“There are four categories of [orbital] debris: (1) inactive payloads, (2) 
operational debris, (3) fragmentation debris, and (4) microparticulate 
debris.”51  In 1995, it was estimated that only 5% of cataloged objects in 
space were operational spacecraft, making the remaining 95% debris.52  
Inactive payloads are defunct satellites still in space,53 either because of a 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Id. at 428. 
 46 Id. 
 47 The Space Economy at a Glance in 2011, OECD (May 23, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/63/5/48301203.pdf. 
 48 Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, para. 1.1. 
 49 INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.  
 50 G.A. Res. 62/217, supra note 15. 
 51 Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share 
Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 128 (2000). 
 52 INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
 53 Jennifer M. Seymour, Note, Containing the Cosmic Crisis: A Proposal for Curbing the 
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malfunction or a loss of propellant,54 and account for 22% of all cataloged 
objects.55  Operational debris is any object intentionally or accidently 
released during a mission,56 including hardware, propellant tanks, and even 
frozen sewage.57  Most operational debris consists of rocket bodies,58 and 
accounts for 17% of all cataloged objects.59  Fragmentation debris is debris 
from breakups of satellites.60  Both intentional collisions, as well as 
accidental collisions and explosions, create fragmentation debris,61 and such 
debris creates most of the trackable orbital debris.62  The U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, as well as a few other countries, intentionally demolish satellites to 
avoid impermissible retrieval by third-parties.63  The U.S. also uses 
inoperable satellites as targets to test antisatellite missiles and laser 
technology.64  This practice generates significant amounts of orbital debris.  
For example, in 2007, China destroyed an inoperable satellite when it tested 
an antisatellite missile, which created in excess of 3,000 pieces of debris, 
accounting for 22% of the currently cataloged objects in LEO.65  After four 
years, only a small portion of the debris from this collision has reentered the 
Earth’s atmosphere.66  Microparticulate debris is the term given to minute 
particles, such as solid-propellant rocket motors and materials from 
spacecraft.67 
Understanding the sources of orbital debris is vital to mitigating the 
addition of more debris into space.  However, the current amount of orbital 
debris is so high that mitigation is no longer enough and techniques for 
remediation must be found. 
                                                                                                                   
Perils of Space Debris, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 891, 893 (1998). 
 54 Taylor, supra note 23, at 9. 
 55 VIIKARI, supra note 10, at 36.   
 56 Sundahl, supra note 51, at 128. 
 57 Bird, supra note 4, at 639. 
 58 Taylor, supra note 23, at 9. 
 59 VIIKARI, supra note 10, at 35. 
 60 Bird, supra note 4, at 640–41. 
 61 Seymour, supra note 53, at 893. 
 62 Bird, supra note 4, at 640. 
 63 Taylor, supra note 23, at 10. 
 64 Seymour, supra note 53, at 893. 
 65 Chinese Debris Reaches New Milestone, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Oct. 2010, at 3, 3, 
available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i4.pdf. 
 66 Update on Three Major Debris Clouds, supra note 6, at 4. 
 67 Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1143 
(1995). 
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C.  The Current Space Environment and Orbital Debris 
The amount of orbital debris in the space environment directly relates to 
the amount of risk for collision that spacecraft and satellites encounter when 
operating in space.  The exact amount of orbital debris is unknown due to an 
inadequacy of tracking and cataloging small objects.68  While many global 
agencies have orbital debris detection capabilities, these detection processes 
merely use ground-based radar to focus on a specific point and track debris 
that moves through the radar scope.69  Only the U.S. and Russia have 
advanced detection systems capable of continuously tracking debris.70   
Information is limited not only by detection systems, but also by the size 
of debris.71  Debris is labeled as either a (1) large object, with a diameter in 
excess of 10 cm, (2) a risk object, with a diameter between 1 cm and 10 cm, 
and (3) microdebris, with a diameter of less than 1 cm.72  The U.S. Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN), uses ground-based radars to observe and 
catalog orbital debris.73  As of 2010, the SSN tracks more than 21,000 large 
objects.74  Due to technical and natural limitations, SSN cannot continuously 
track or catalog risk objects,75 but it is estimated that more than 300,000 risk 
objects currently exist in the Earth’s orbits.76  The inherent tracking 
limitations of risk objects create the most significant threat because risk 
objects “are capable of causing catastrophic damage if they collide with other 
space objects,” despite their size.77  Similarly, microdebris also presents a 
threat of damage upon collision, is untraceable due to size, and estimates 
suggest that millions of microdebris particles exist in the Earth’s space 
environment.78   
                                                                                                                   
 68 Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a 
Binding International Agreement to Clean up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 603 
(2011). 
 69 Pusey, supra note 31, at 433. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. 
 72 NASA Exploring Ways to Clean Up Space Debris, DNA (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.dn 
aindia.com/scitech/report_nasa-exploring-ways-to-clean-up-space-debris_1661364.  
 73 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 53. 
 74 SPACESECURITY.ORG, supra note 1, at 28. 
 75 Pusey, supra note 31, at 433 
 76 SPACESECURITY.ORG, supra note 1, at 29. 
 77 VIIKARI, supra note 10, at 36. 
 78 INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
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D.  The Risks Associated with Orbital Debris 
A collision between a spacecraft and even the smallest piece of orbital 
debris can cause millions of dollars worth of damage.79  Explaining the 
likelihood and risks of such a collision shows that orbital debris is an 
increasing problem that needs the international community’s attention 
immediately.80  The consequence of orbital debris contacting a spacecraft or 
satellite is a function of the probability of collision and the magnitude of 
damage upon impact.81  The location of the debris also influences the 
consequences of a collision, since density and velocity varies between 
orbits.82 
The probability of collision between orbital debris and a spacecraft 
depends on the size and orbital altitude of the spacecraft, as well as the 
anticipated orbital period for the spacecraft.83  Therefore, a larger spacecraft, 
traveling at high velocity in LEO for many years, is more likely to collide 
with another object than a small spacecraft in one fixed location in GEO.84    
The effect of impact between orbital debris and a spacecraft depends on 
velocity of both the spacecraft and the debris, the angle of impact with the 
spacecraft, and the mass of the debris.85  If a large debris object, moving at a 
high velocity, directly hits the middle of a spacecraft, moving at high 
velocity, the impact will cause more damage than if a slow moving 
microdebris object hits a sidepiece or antenna of a spacecraft.  Miniscule 
debris particles can also cause surface damage over time.  When orbital 
debris is smaller than .01 cm, the typical impact effect on a spacecraft’s 
surface is pitting and erosion; however, over time this may cause significant 
damage.86  Objects with a size ranging from .01 cm to 1 cm can cause 
substantial structural damage upon impact with a spacecraft, if no shields are 
present.87  Similarly, a debris fragment of merely .05 mm would be able to 
“puncture a standard spacesuit and kill an astronaut.”88  Orbital debris larger 
                                                                                                                   
 79 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 64 (identifying that in the sixteen months prior to 
March of 1997, thirteen shuttle windows had to be replaced at a cost of over $40,000 each). 
 80 Taylor, supra note 23, at 18–19. 
 81 Id. at 16. 
 82 Id. 
 83 INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 8. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id.  
 88 VIIKARI, supra note 10, at 38 n.49. 
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than 1 cm would likely cause catastrophic damage to any spacecraft 
regardless of shields.89   
Given the substantial damage that tiny pieces of debris can cause, 
measures must be taken to avoid debris collisions with operational 
spacecraft.90  Avoidance measures, such as tracking orbital debris and then 
moving spacecraft that are likely to collide with debris, are impossible 
because SSN can only continuously track objects larger than 5 cm in 
diameter.91  While experts cannot ascertain the exact level of risk of collision 
for a particular object in space, it is estimated that a spacecraft in LEO is 100 
times more likely to be struck by debris than a spacecraft in GEO.92  In LEO, 
an object will break up into multiple fragments if it is struck by a piece of 
debris .1% of its own mass.93  This catastrophic collision would create tens 
or hundreds of fragments large enough to cause another collision of this 
scale.94  These dire consequences show the importance of finding a scientific 
solution, such as remediation techniques, in order to keep the space 
environment sustainable for future use.   
E.  The Future of the Space Environment  
Despite current mitigation efforts, natural orbital clearing, and de-
orbiting, the amount of orbital debris is increasing.95  In 2009, orbital debris 
increased by 13%.96  Leading NASA physicists concluded that there is a 
direct correlation between the number of objects in space and the number of 
collisions between these objects.97  Some experts posit the application of the 
cascade effect, which propounds that debris will become self-generating; 
collisions will produce debris, which will create more collisions, and will 
result in more debris.98  Others look to the Kessler Syndrome, under which 
experts predict that the debris population will increase regardless of future 
space operations and will eventually cause orbits to become so saturated that 
                                                                                                                   
 89 INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Nicholas D. Welly, Enlightened State-Interest—A Legal Framework for Protecting the 
“Common Interest of all Mankind” from Hardinian Tragedy, 36 J. SPACE L. 273, 265 (2010), 
available at http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/jsl/pdfs/articles/jsl-36-welly.pdf. 
 92 NAT’L RESEARCH COMM. ON ORBITAL DEBRIS, ORBITAL DEBRIS: A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 
98 (1995), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=4765&page=98. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 79. 
 96 Welly, supra note 91, at 285. 
 97 Id. at 287. 
 98 Bird, supra note 4, at 643. 
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they are unavailable for satellite use.99  Furthermore, experts anticipate that 
the exponential increase in debris will create a belt of debris around the 
Earth.100  The Kessler Syndrome postulates a bleak outlook for the future of 
the space environment.  Based on these scientific hypothesis, it is essential 
that the space community begin developing technology to remove debris 
from space now.  
F.  Current Scientific Solutions   
Despite predictions based on the Kessler Syndrome, some scientific 
solutions may lessen the risk of orbital debris.  Current solutions include: (1) 
shielding attachments to protect spacecraft, (2) tracking systems to avoid 
collisions with debris, (3) control measures to manage the re-entry of 
spacecraft, that would become debris, back into Earth’s atmosphere, and (4) 
navigation maneuvers to direct satellites into an outer orbit beyond GEO.101  
Additionally, the space environment does provide one completely natural 
solution to the orbital debris problem: LEO has some amount of atmospheric 
drag and is able to cleanse itself of debris on a very small scale.102  Thus, 
while these methods are helpful at reducing the amount of future debris, they 
fail to actually eliminate the problem because they do not remove the current 
debris already in space.  Furthermore, these solutions are very expensive and 
not all actors utilize them all the time.103   
All spacecraft and satellites are equipped with outer shields to provide 
extra protection in case they collide with another object, mainly orbital 
debris.  However, shields are only protective to a limited degree.104  A shield 
will enable a spacecraft to withstand impact by pieces of debris that are 1 cm 
or less in diameter.105  While these impacts will not totally destroy the 
spacecraft, in most circumstances they will still require extensive repair.106  
Additionally, a considerable portion of debris in space is larger than 1 cm, 
which limits the effectiveness of shields against all sizes of orbital debris.107  
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Shielding is also expensive and can increase satellite mass and reduce 
maneuvering capability.108 
The SSN, as well as other space surveillance networks, tracks orbital 
debris and predicts the likelihood of collision between two objects.109  When 
the probability of collision is too high, the satellite or spacecraft is 
maneuvered to reduce the chance of collision, known as collision 
avoidance.110  For instance, NASA will only use collision avoidance 
maneuvers when another object is expected to come within 2 km (1.24 miles) 
of a spacecraft or satellite.111  The devastating consequences these collisions 
can have mean that avoidance measures are often taken, even when the 
chance of collision seems small.  For example, in October 2010, the 
International Space Station (ISS) changed orbit slightly to avoid a piece of 
debris that had a 1 in 1,000 chance of colliding with the ISS.112  In March 
2009, the ISS crew took last minute refuge in their return vehicle because it 
was too late to conduct a collision avoidance maneuver due to a piece of 
debris that changed orbit rapidly.113  All in all, NASA conducted eight 
collision avoidance maneuvers in 2009.114 
There are many drawbacks to the use of collision avoidance.  First, SSN 
is only able to track large debris objects, rendering risk objects (1 cm to 10 
cm), which have the capability to destroy a spacecraft, invisible and 
unavoidable.115  Second, there is some degree of uncertainty in the position 
measurements for both the spacecraft and the orbital debris.116  Lastly, 
collision avoidance is costly for operators.117  
LEO has a small amount of atmospheric drag that will naturally pull 
objects back into the Earth’s atmosphere.118  It takes approximately fifteen 
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years for objects that operate at 600 km (373 miles) above sea level to re-
enter the Earth’s atmosphere.119  Unfortunately, most spacecraft operate in 
altitudes exceeding 850 km (528 miles) above sea level, where decay time is 
measured in centuries.120  Objects that are naturally brought back into the 
Earth’s atmosphere will most likely be burned up upon reentry.121  The main 
factor in determining whether an object will be completely destroyed upon 
reentrance into the Earth’s atmosphere is the spacecraft’s melting 
temperature.122  Large objects can remain intact until ground impact if they 
are comprised of high melting-point materials (titanium or stainless steel).123 
In LEO, satellites use gravitational pull to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere 
at the end of their mission life, ensuring that they do not become orbital 
debris when they are no longer operational.124  This controlled reentry is 
accomplished by reserving propellant to direct the spacecraft into the Earth’s 
atmosphere at a steeper flight path.125  Before controlled reentry occurs, a 
projection of the latitude and longitude for where the object may land is 
taken into account, as well as any threat to human life or property.126  U.S. 
policy dictates that the human casualty probability for a controlled reentry 
should be less than 1 in 10,000.127  Therefore, most satellites have projected 
landings in the ocean or uninhabited regions.128  While reentry is a great way 
to dispose of satellites before they become orbital debris, it is only applicable 
to satellites in LEO.  GEO has nominal gravitational pull, with decay times 
measured in centuries.  Therefore, controlled reentry is not a feasible solution 
to dispose of satellites in GEO.  Additionally, there is an uncertain risk to 
human life during reentry.   
Since there is no atmospheric drag in GEO and de-orbiting satellites back 
down to LEO is extremely expensive, satellites in GEO use a graveyard orbit 
at the end of their mission life.129  The graveyard orbit is located directly 
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above and below GEO.130  Like controlled reentry, satellites use the 
remainder of their propellant to boost into this orbit before they become 
inoperable, thus becoming, orbital debris.131  While the space community as 
a whole recommends the use of the graveyard orbit, even esteemed space 
operators, such as NASA, do not uniformly follow this practice.132  In many 
instances, the exact amount of remaining propellant is unknown and satellites 
run out of propellant before reaching the graveyard orbit.133  Disposing of 
satellites in the graveyard orbit requires advanced planning, which many of 
the satellites in GEO were not intended to do.134  Therefore, their operations 
must be cut short in order to have enough propellant to reach the graveyard 
orbit.135  Additionally, as the graveyard orbit fills up, it could potentially 
become a source of future orbital debris and effect lower orbits.136  The use 
of the graveyard orbit is a simple solution for now; however, it does not 
come close to fixing the problem of orbital debris.   
While shielding, collision maneuvering, reentry of LEO satellites into the 
Earth’s atmosphere, and disposing of GEO satellites into the graveyard orbit 
are all helpful scientific practices, the amount of orbital debris is still rapidly 
increasing to a level that is not sustainable for the space environment.  The 
only potential answer to the orbital debris problem is the creation of 
remediation techniques.   
III.  THE STAGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION: THE CASE FOR 
REMEDIATION 
Historically, the sequence of actions in addressing an environmental issue 
has progressed from identifying the problem, to instituting norms, to 
mitigation, and then, finally, remediation.137  The space community has 
progressed to the stage of mitigation even though the UN Mitigation 
Guidelines are voluntary.138  Remediation is the final step to solving the 
orbital debris problem, although there is no cost-effective, operational 
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method currently available.139  According to Baiocchi, the next stage of 
action will arise when the community’s tolerance for risk is lower than the 
amount of risk.140  The space community will progress to remediation when 
“the existing level of unwanted [orbital debris] exceeds the community’s risk 
tolerance level.”141 
What changes a community’s tolerance of risk?  History demonstrates 
that increasing awareness by educating the community is one means.142  
However, another more probable occurrence is a critical or catastrophic 
event, which would effectively raise the amount of orbital debris and 
decrease the community’s tolerance threshold.143   
Examining past environmental events and analogizing them to the current 
orbital debris problem clearly shows that remediation techniques must be 
designed and tested now, before a catastrophic event takes place.144  The 
2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is an excellent example of a community’s 
failure to design and test remediation techniques.145  The remedies that 
British Petroleum attempted such as the containment dome and relief well 
were successful in past oil spills.146  These approaches did not fail because 
they constituted new technology, they failed because they were not tested or 
proven to work at a depth of 5,000 feet.147  Therefore, it is critical that the 
space community learns from past environmental disasters and begins to 
design and test remediation techniques now, prior to a catastrophic event that 
lowers the community’s acceptable level of orbital debris tolerance.   
IV.  CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
Current international space law is inadequate at addressing the problem of 
orbital debris.  There are four main international treaties enacted through the 
United Nations which make up the basis of space law.148  The hazards of 
orbital debris were unknown at the time these treaties were drafted and they 
fail to effectively protect the space environment.  The U.N.’s Orbital debris 
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Mitigation Guidelines are the most influential international policy, which 
aim to reduce the amount of debris generated during missions.149  While 
these guidelines show that the space community is aware of the problem and 
searching for solutions, they only restrict the addition of future debris and 
fail to address the removal of current debris from the space environment.  
Therefore, these guidelines, as well as the U.N. treaties, are not an all-
encompassing answer to the orbital debris problem.  
A.  Binding International Treaties 
Four international treaties govern outer space activities: (1) the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space 
Treaty),150 (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue 
and Return Agreement),151 (3) the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention),152 and (4) the 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention).153  The Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention are the most relevant treaties in the discussion on orbital debris 
and the space environment.   
1.  The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty was ratified in 1967 and is revered as the 
constitution of space law.154  This treaty creates binding legal obligations on 
the states that ratify it, while some provisions are so widely accepted that 
they are considered customary international law, which is applicable to both 
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parties and non-parties to the convention.155  An example of customary 
international law includes Articles I and II, which makes outer space a 
common pool resource.156  While there are some broad principles in the 
treaty that refer to the space environment, there is no clear obligation placed 
on states to ensure they protect the space environment.157   
Specifically, there are three general articles relevant to the discussion of a 
state’s responsibility for the space environment.  First, under Article VI, 
states have international responsibility for any national activity, whether by 
governmental agencies or private actors.158  This means a private company 
that launches from a specific state will fall under the control of that state, and 
in turn that state will be subject to the liabilities and responsibilities under the 
treaty for that private company’s activities.  Second, Article VII declares that 
any party that procures the launch or launches a space object is 
internationally liable for damage resulting from that object or its parts; this 
provision is later fleshed out by the Liability Convention.159  Third, Article 
IX inadvertently addresses the space environment by stating:  
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be 
guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance 
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space… with due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties 
to the Treaty.  States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies 
of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
contamination . . . .160 
This treaty as a whole does not sufficiently address the preservation of the 
space environment or establish clear obligations and sanctions for state 
parties.  On its face, it does not even reference orbital debris.  The treaty’s 
major problem is a lack of clearly defined terms, such as harmful 
contamination, launching state, or space object.161  Due to these ambiguous 
                                                                                                                   
 155 Id. 
 156 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 150, arts. I, II (stating space is the “province of all 
mankind” and is “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”). 
 157 Gérardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet 
Development of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 737 (2009). 
 158 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 150, art. VI. 
 159 Id. art. VII. 
 160 Id. art. IX. 
 161 Peter T. Limperis, Note, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law 
 
604  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:585 
 
terms, the legal obligations under the treaty are uncertain.162  These terms 
would have to be specifically defined in order to establish an enforcement 
regime.163  This treaty also fails to adequately address the protection of the 
space environment because it was drafted during the Cold War, when only a 
few states were concentrating on access to space and the thought of an 
overcrowded dangerous space environment was not predicted or even 
considered.164  Drafters of the treaty failed to realize that space activities 
would one day become privatized, commonplace, and essential to the 
functioning of our society.165   
By initially making space a common pool resource, actors are provoked 
to take utmost advantage of the resource in the shortest time possible.166  
After a cost-benefit analysis, most actors find it in their best interest to seek 
the benefits of space activities and ignore the costs of creating orbital debris, 
thereby spreading the costs of creating debris to all space-faring nations.167  
Most actors choose to ignore the costs of creating debris because it is 
expensive, time consuming, and there is not an affirmative duty to do so.168  
While some actors have recently made it a priority to start protecting the 
space environment, there are still many actors that are free-riders.  These 
free-riders have either not taken the initiative to reduce the amount of debris 
they produce or have relied on the research and construction of mitigation 
guidelines that other actors and organizations produce.  This inconsistency 
within the space community can and potentially will cause friction among 
states.  While recognizing that some actors, especially ones that are new to 
the space community, are not responsible for the current space environment, 
a solution requiring equal contribution between actors is more realistic 
considering that the power players in the space community are undoubtedly 
the actors most responsible for the current orbital debris problem.  These 
power players most likely feel responsible for the current situation, though it 
is perhaps unfeasible for them to provide all the resources to finding a 
solution, especially when, at the time they were directly harming the space 
                                                                                                                   
Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Regimes for Damage Caused 
by Debris, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319 (1998); Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the 
Problem of Orbital Debris: Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (1992). 
 162 Welly, supra note 91, at 293. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Roberts, supra note 161, at 52. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 59. 
 167 Welly, supra note 91, at 287. 
 168 Pusey, supra note 31, at 447. 
2012] ORBITAL DEBRIS 2012  605 
 
environment by producing a large amount of debris, they did not know the 
effects of their actions.  Additionally, many actors, specifically the U.S., are 
cutting funding to their space programs.169  According to Professor Garrett 
Hardin, this will eventually lead to a tragedy of the commons, where the 
space environment is ruined.170   
2.  Liability Convention 
The Liability Convention was enacted in 1972 to expand on article VII of 
the Outer Space Treaty.171  It was drafted in response to the international 
community’s fear of space objects reentering the Earth’s atmosphere and the 
corresponding threat to life.172  Drafters were not concerned about damage to 
objects in space.173  The Liability Convention assigns strict liability for any 
damage that occurs on the Earth’s surface and fault-based liability for 
damage that arises in space.174   
Fault-based liability for collisions transpiring in space is not feasible.175  
First, evidentiary problems exist because it is complicated, and in many 
instances impossible, to identify the owner of orbital debris.176  In most 
cases, the identity of the offending state is unknown and a claim is never 
filed, leaving the cost of repair or replacement on the owner of the spacecraft 
or satellite.177  The Convention also does not define the terms “standard of 
care” or fault.178  This makes it difficult to hold a state liable because it is 
unclear when a state’s action would be considered the cause of damage.179  
The Liability Convention does not incentivize actors to reduce the amount of 
debris they create or to remove debris because they do not fear they will be 
held liable.180   
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Claims under the Liability Convention do not provide much guidance 
either, as evidenced by the fact that it has only been used once,181 when a 
nuclear propelled Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954, crashed into Canada.182  The 
cost of cleanup was more than $14 million Canadian dollars, C$3 million of 
which was paid by the Soviet Union after Canada invoked the Liability 
Convention.183  There was uncertainty as to whether the Soviets were even 
required to pay under the Liability Convention, since Canada only suffered 
the expense of cleanup and no persons or property were harmed.184  The 
Liability Convention has never been tested in regards to in-orbit collisions, 
although there have been many. 
B.  Non-Binding International Policies 
The United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted by the General 
Assembly in December of 2007 is the main international agreement aimed at 
combating the orbital debris crisis.185  The Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC), which is an international organization 
consisting of members from all of the major space-faring states, first 
developed the Mitigation Guidelines.186  They are based on common 
principles found in several handbooks and standards promulgated by national 
and international organizations within the space community.187  With cost-
effectiveness in mind, the IADC developed these guidelines to “be 
considered during the planning and design of spacecraft and launch vehicles 
in order to minimize or eliminate the generation of debris during 
operations.”188  There are two general categories of mitigation measures: 
ones that restrain the production of debris in the short term and ones that 
restrain the production of debris in the long term.189  The first category 
focuses on the reduction of debris during missions, while the second focuses 
on post-mission disposal of spacecraft in crowded orbits, such as LEO and 
GEO.190 
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The first measure calls for the proper design of a spacecraft so as to limit 
the release of debris during normal operations.191  For example, sensor 
covers and other items on a spacecraft should not be intentionally released.192  
Minimalizing the potential for on-orbit break-ups is the second measure.193  
Depleting or safely storing any on-board sources of stored energy, thereby 
reducing the potential for post mission break-ups, can achieve this.194  This 
second measure also seeks to minimize the potential for break-ups during the 
operational phase by properly designing the spacecraft and then periodically 
monitoring it to detect malfunctions.195  Additionally, this measure aims to 
avoid the intentional destruction of a spacecraft.196  The third guideline 
addresses post mission disposal.197  Spacecraft in GEO should be removed to 
the graveyard orbit as discussed earlier, at an altitude of about 235 km (146 
miles) higher than GEO, so as not to affect the geostationary orbit.198  
Spacecraft in LEO region that have completed their operational phases 
should be de-orbited or maneuvered into an orbit with a reduced lifetime.199  
The guidelines state that after the completion of a mission, spacecraft should 
be de-orbited into the Earth’s atmosphere within twenty-five years.200  
Lastly, the Mitigation Guidelines wish to prevent on-orbit collisions.201 
While the Mitigation Guidelines are certainly a step in the right direction, 
they are not a comprehensive solution for the debris overload in space.  
These Guidelines brought the problem of orbital debris into the international 
spotlight and provided guidance to countries for spacecraft design and 
mission control.202  However, they are essentially a codification of frequent 
practices of various space-faring nations and do not institute any new 
development in the field of debris mitigation.203  Additionally, these 
guidelines “are not legally binding under international law.”204  Therefore, 
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even countries that endorse the guidelines do not always comply with them; 
in 2008 and 2009, both the U.S. and Russia failed to perform disposal 
maneuvers on five spacecrafts.205  Even with these guidelines in place, only 
one in three spacecraft in GEO is disposed of in the graveyard orbit.206  
Lastly, these measures are aimed solely at mitigation, which, at best, only 
slows down the growth of orbital debris.207  As the Kessler Syndrome states, 
even without adding to the amount of debris in orbit, the current amount of 
orbital debris is capable of becoming self generating and will one day 
produce a belt of debris around the Earth that will limit the use of outer 
space.208  According to Nicholas L. Johnson, NASA Chief Scientist of 
Orbital Debris, “[o]nly remediation of the near-Earth environment—the 
removal of existing large objects from orbit—can prevent future problems 
for research in and commercialization of space.”209  Although the Mitigation 
Guidelines were a great first step, efforts should now be focused on 
remediation techniques.  
V.  PROPOSALS FOR A NEW LEGAL REGIME 
Numerous proposals suggest altering the legal regime to adequately 
address the problem of orbital debris.  The main suggestions are: (1) the 
adoption of a new international treaty, (2) the development of customary 
international law, (3) reformation of the Liability Convention, (4) the 
creation of a compensation fund, and (5) the implementation of a market 
share liability system.  Each proposal has serious defects that would inhibit 
their ability to fully correct the degradation of the space environment. 
A.  A New International Treaty 
Using the traditional form of international cooperation by creating a new 
U.N. treaty will not provide an effective solution to the current problem.  A 
treaty promulgated through the U.N. would prove to be ineffective because a 
consensus between all of the space-faring nations would be very time 
consuming and would most likely result in a watered-down resolution.210  
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The differing interests of developed nations versus undeveloped nations 
would create conflict and frustration, and, thus, delay the process.211  
 Unlike other subjects . . . the topic of space debris does not 
involve a balancing of interests; what is important is that the 
common safety interest of the space nations be satisfied.  As 
the problem of space debris is of great urgency to all space 
nations, the forum to be chosen for concluding international 
agreements should promise an objective and fruitful discussion 
speedily leading to an acceptable solution . . . . [T]he Outer 
Space Committee of the United Nations does not seem to be 
the right forum for such a discussion.212 
B.  Customary International Law 
Customary law is not a feasible solution to the orbital debris problem.  
Customary law “consist[s] of customs that are accepted as legal requirements 
or obligatory rules of conduct.”213  In order for a norm to become customary 
law nations must actually feel obliged to practice the custom.214  Most of the 
Mitigation Guidelines, as well as other actions done to protect the space 
environment, are not considered norms, because all actors in the space 
community do not routinely follow them.215  Examples include spacecraft 
that are not disposed of in the graveyard orbit or spacecraft that are not de-
orbited in LEO.216  In addition, the Mitigation Guidelines are only voluntary; 
therefore, the second element of customary law, opinio juris, is not 
satisfied.217  Customary international law is also not a proper instrument 
because it is confined to general rules and would, therefore, not be suitable 
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for the specific technical problems of orbital debris.218  Moreover, it is 
generally based on existing state practice and, as a result, is not suitable for 
the anticipatory, forward-looking legal framework needed to address the 
orbital debris.219   
C.  Reforming the Liability Convention 
Several proposals call for various changes to the existing fault-based 
liability regime for damage sustained in orbit under the Liability Convention.  
Proponents claim that the Liability Convention can become more effective 
and properly incentivize actors to reduce, and one day remove, orbital 
debris.220  Some proposals suggest specific definitions for orbital debris and 
fault.221  Others suggest modifying the regime so that actors who fail to 
implement mitigation measures are presumed liable for damage.222  Those 
who believe a fault-based system is unfeasible or unfair often suggest a strict 
liability regime, thereby eliminating fault.223  However, as discussed above, 
none of these proposals are sufficient because determining the culpable state 
through identification of debris is nearly impossible.   
D.  Compensation or Liability Fund 
Some commentators suggest further reforming the liability convention by 
also proposing a damage compensation fund.224  Under this proposed regime, 
all space users would be required to pay into a fund; the fee would be based 
on the estimated amount of debris the proposed mission would create.225  
Proceeds would be used to compensate actors whose spacecraft sustained 
damage caused by unidentified debris and who therefore cannot pursue a 
claim because they cannot identify the culpable party.226  Presumably, actors 
would then take affirmative steps, such as safer spacecraft design or the 
eventual removal of debris, to reduce their liability or payment into the fund.  
This regime, however, is flawed in many ways.  First, not all damage to 
spacecraft can be attributed to artificial man-made orbital debris.  Some of it 
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occurs from natural satellites, such as meteors.227  Second, determining how 
much debris a mission will create is not an accurate formula, therefore, some 
states may not fully feel the effects of their contribution to the debris 
problem.228  Third, if a major or multiple collisions occurred that were 
caused by unidentified debris, the fund may be depleted.229   
Another variation on this concept is the idea that “past polluters pay” in 
proportion to the amount of debris they are responsible for in the space 
environment.230  The two biggest past polluters are the U.S. and U.S.S.R.231  
It is likely that the U.S. and Russia will be unwilling to adopt this regime 
because it is not in their best interest.232  If the U.S. and Russia, who have 
notable influence among the space-faring nations, do not support this change, 
it is highly unlikely that the international community would be able to adopt 
this regime. 
E.  Market-Share Liability 
Another faction of commentators believe that market-share liability 
would be a successful regime change because it would make actors fully 
internalize the costs of producing debris.233  Internalizing the cost means that 
actors would be held responsible for their debris and would either continue to 
pay that price or would find ways to reduce their liability.  This regime 
focuses on protecting an injured party who has no recourse when 
unidentifiable debris causes damage.234  Under this theory, every country is 
held liable for its proportion of total debris in space, thus the injured party’s 
damages would be collected from every actor who has debris in space at that 
time.235   
Under a market-share scheme, Russia and the U.S. would be paying the 
bulk of the bill.236  “These states are the great pioneers in space use but they 
are also the primary contributors to the debris problem.”237  In 2005, it was 
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estimated that the U.S. and Russia were responsible for 90% of the debris in 
space.238  However, these numbers have presumably changed due to China’s 
recent anti-satellite missile test, which increased the amount of debris.239   
Proponents of this system believe it will create an instant compensation 
system, so that states will no longer have to absorb the costs of collisions.240  
They believe it would create an incentive for states to reduce their production 
of large debris.241  They also claim it will encourage states to improve 
remediation or removal techniques, which would lower the amount of debris 
they are responsible for and, consequently, lower their proportion of liability 
and payment.242  Additionally, advocates allege that states would improve 
their registering, tracking, and cataloguing systems, because actors could 
potentially exculpate themselves if they had more accurate tracking 
systems.243 
However, many drawbacks exist in a market-share liability system that 
would inhibit its acceptance by the international community.  Some states 
may choose not to adopt or improve mitigation measures because their 
portion of liability would remain small regardless of their actions.244  The 
main reason why market-share liability could fail to be adopted is that, once 
again, the U.S. and Russia will probably reject this proposal.245  Under this 
regime, both countries will never recover more than two-thirds of the value 
of their damaged or destroyed spacecraft.246  Furthermore, increased 
mitigation techniques will not reduce their amount of liability because of past 
pollution; only debris removal will reduce their contribution.247  Lastly, and 
most importantly, if a significant amount of collisions by unidentified debris 
occurred, the U.S. and Russia would easily owe millions of dollars.248  Since 
the U.S. and Russia are the major actors in the space community, their 
support is vital for the adoption of this regime.249  It is highly unforeseeable 
that they would support a regime that imposes such a high burden of liability 
on them.   
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VI.  MARKET POWER AND A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT 
Effective remediation techniques for the space environment need to be 
developed and tested now, before a catastrophic event takes place.  Current 
international space law does not effectively address the situation.  The 
demographics of the space community provide a select group of actors with 
market power.  This market power can be leveraged to enable a regime 
change to address the problem of orbital debris.  This Note posits that the 
five actors with market power should sign a multilateral agreement that 
requires a fee to be levied for every launch that occurs.  These fees will go 
into an account that will fund the design and testing of technology to 
remediate the space environment.   Imposing a launch fee on every actor is 
the only feasible solution because (1) individual actors in the space 
community either cannot or will not develop remediation techniques on their 
own in the immediate future, (2) the space community as a whole will not be 
able to reach a voluntary consensus on paying into a fund to design 
remediation techniques, and (3) market power, in regards to the space 
community, is the sole means of control.  
This proposal is aimed at finding a legal avenue to facilitate a scientific 
solution in the shortest amount of time.  Financing the research and 
development of remediation techniques has been a large hindrance to finding 
a solution so far; this proposal directly addresses these financing issues.  This 
proposal also gets to the heart of the problem by directly developing 
remediation techniques, rather than imposing a regime that would incentivize 
actors to develop the needed technology for remediation.  Additionally, 
many of the changes or additions to the current legal regime discussed above 
would be less crucial after a technique is found and remediation begins.  
The demographics of the space community are unique and inherently lend 
certain actors market power, which is the most effective way to implement a 
regime change.  Most actors rely on other actors for access to space.  Out of 
the sixty actors who utilize space, only ten have independent orbital launch 
capability: Russia, the United States, China, France, the U.K., India, Japan, 
Israel, Iran, and the ESA.250  Furthermore, only a few of these states are 
active in the commercial launch sector.251  “For a launch to be considered 
commercial, at least one of the payload’s launch contracts must be subject to 
international competition; thus, in principle, a launch opportunity is available 
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to any capable launch services provider.”252  Russia, Europe, and the U.S. 
dominate in the commercial launch industry; Russia launches the most 
satellites annually, commercial or otherwise.253  Recently, India and China 
have launched satellites for other countries with more frequency.254  A few 
private commercial companies also have independent launch capabilities.255  
For instance, Arianespace, a European corporation, and the first commercial 
satellite launch company, is responsible for placing half of the commercial 
satellites in orbit that are currently in service.256  For purposes of this Note, 
private companies will be grouped under the respective state from which 
they launch, and any reference to a specific state will refer to those private 
companies as well.  The effects of the multilateral agreement, i.e., the launch 
fee, will pertain to private companies because under the Outer Space Treaty, 
states have responsibility for any object launched from their jurisdiction; 
private commercial launch companies are governed and regulated by their 
respective states.257  For example, the Department of Transportation 
regulates commercial space launch activities in the U.S.258  Therefore, a 
company will be bound by their country’s national legislation, such as a 
multilateral agreement.     
Based on the makeup of the space community and the reliance on a few 
actors for access to space, the five actors that dominate the space launch 
industry have market power.  “The capability to launch is a rare commodity 
and provides those who possess it with interesting leverage.”259  Russia, the 
ESA, and the U.S. have significant control and power over the space 
community since they provide most of the community’s access to space.  
Market power enables them to impose a system that forces players in the 
space community to abide by a regime or system they impose in order to 
gain access to space.  It is imperative that Russia, the U.S., and the ESA be 
involved in the multilateral agreement, because they are the most prominent 
states in the space launch sector.  However, it would also be prudent to 
include India and China due to their most recent launches of foreign state 
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satellites and their recent announcements to take a more vital role in the 
space launch sector.260   
While these fees will be collected based on the number of launches that 
occur in each the jurisdiction, each actor can individually decide how they 
will structure their collection of money from other actors to pay for this fee.  
In essence, the actual government will not have to bear the entirety of every 
fee because it can pass the cost down to the private company who actually 
conducted the launch or to another state if they are contracting out their 
launch capabilities.  However, some actors will pay more due to the fact that 
they launch more objects into space.  Furthermore, the fees will have to be 
balanced so that it is a reasonable amount, but also enough to find a solution.  
The agreement should not set a fixed fee; it should be flexible so it can 
change with time if need be.  After a technique is developed the fees can be 
adjusted to cover the cost of using that technique to clean up the space 
environment and then regular missions thereafter to remove future debris. 
The five actors with market power can decide on how best to use these 
funds.  One option is to create a committee that evaluates and funds various 
scientific teams working on remediation techniques.  Another more ideal 
option is to create a new entity or organization that not only manages the 
fund, but also conducts the scientific research.  This Note will not address all 
of the nuances and problems that would arise with the creation of a new 
entity resulting from this multilateral agreement, however some general 
thoughts and ideas are suggested.  It would be optimal if scientists currently 
working on remediation teams in their home states went to one central 
location and worked together, thus further promoting international 
cooperation, a main goal in space exploration and also within the U.N.  The 
agreement can either require each party to provide a given number of 
scientists, allow it to be voluntary, or allow for scientists from other states 
not in the agreement to join the team.  Having scientists on site would 
undoubtedly put the brightest minds together, leading to faster results.  
Having one entity conduct research would also eliminate the possibility that 
some research is being duplicated, is a likely scenario today since most states 
are individually pursuing a solution.  Additionally, if this one entity solely 
focused on finding a solution, individual states would no longer need to 
pursue their own research, which would allow states to divert funding from 
those research teams to pay the launch fees without any added cost. 
The use of these funds will also have to be carefully drafted in the 
multilateral agreement so as to incentivize these five actors to agree.  For 
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example, each actor will probably want a share of control over the entity to 
ensure that progress is being made.  While in the past states used advances in 
space exploration to tout their power and were inclined to find a solution on 
their own for recognitions sake, this approach must be curbed because the 
dangers of orbital debris are too pressing and international cooperation is 
needed to find a solution in the near future.  International cooperation is 
possible however, as evidenced by the creation and launch of the 
International Space Station.  Working together to build and maintain the ISS 
created good will among nations, a potential outcome for the creation of an 
international remediation agreement as well.261   
This proposal is necessary because the space community will not be able 
to reach a consensus on implementing an effective solution within a short 
time period.  Today’s space community has many actors with diverse 
interests, which makes it difficult to reach a consensus decision within the 
legal community. Advanced actors, such as the U.S., Russia, and the ESA, 
with developed space programs are starting to shift from state run programs 
to privatized commercialization.262  They are focused on making the 
utilization of space economically feasible for private actors; with this in 
mind, remediation of the space environment is vital to keep costs low enough 
to promote the use of space by private actors.  On the other hand, emerging 
actors in the space community, which tend to have less developed programs, 
may not view damage to the space environment with the same level of 
concern as developed space-faring nations.263  Access to space, and having 
an equal claim to geostationary slots, are the main concerns of these 
countries.264  These polarized interests make it difficult for the international 
community to move forward in addressing the problem of orbital debris.  
Having five actors implement a regime with their market power is more 
logistically feasible than a general consensus among all actors in the space 
community. 
This proposal is superior to the suggested regime changes mentioned 
above for many reasons.  First, a multilateral approach could be implemented 
in less time than the suggested proposals, especially a new international 
treaty or the development of customary international law.  It would also be 
unlike a new international treaty or the development of customary 
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international law because it would not be watered down and would allow for 
an effective and specific solution.  It is unlike proposals to reform the 
liability convention, to create a compensation fund, and the adoption of a 
market share plan, in that this proposal specifically addresses remediation 
rather than attempting to incentivize actors to remediate the space 
environment.  Incentives do not ensure hard and fast results.  Some actors 
might be disincentivized to spend money on remediation techniques if they 
have to spend billions of dollars on damages under a market-share liability 
plan.  Furthermore, a fee per launch regime is forward looking, instead of 
based on past transgressions, which is important considering states did not 
know the harm in producing orbital debris.   
The remediation of space will benefit all space-faring states by making 
the space environment less dangerous, and will subsequently lower the risk 
of collisions.  A multilateral agreement to impose a fee on all launches 
spreads the cost of remediation to all actors in the community currently 
seeking access to space.  Russia, the U.S., and China are responsible for a 
majority of the debris located in space.265  Since many states believe that past 
polluters should pay,266 it is in the best interest of Russia, the U.S., and China 
to choose a regime that benefits them by spreading the cost of remediation to 
all actors in the community.  Furthermore, these countries, especially the 
U.S. and Russia, have led the way in regards to space exploration and should 
once again take such an important and prominent role and lead the way with 
remediation.      
A multilateral agreement between the five states that have market power 
is the sole means of control in the space community.  This fee system will 
provide the fastest and most efficient way to clean up the space environment.  
States that do not have independent launch capability will be forced to either 
pay the tax or acquire launch capability; since, the cost of developing launch 
technology is extremely expensive and launch programs take many years to 
become successful,267 most states will probably chose to pay the necessary 
fee.  Thus, if actors with launch capabilities, which are not included in the 
multilateral agreement begin to commercially launch other actors’ spacecraft, 
then the five actors in the agreement can use various forms of political 
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pressure to convince them to sign onto the agreement.  A safe space 
environment is important because “[t]he world has become increasingly 
reliant on the benefits derived from space-based technologies.”268  
Remediation of the space environment is the only way to fix the orbital 
debris problem and in the long run, all states will benefit from a multilateral 
agreement among the leaders in the commercial launch industry to collect a 
fee for every launch that occurs in their jurisdiction. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 At the beginning of the space age, little thought was given to the risks of 
orbital debris.  Space has become more crowded and an increasingly 
dangerous environment, due to the growing number of new actors with 
access to space and the ability of debris to become self-generating.  “Millions 
of individuals rely on space applications on a daily basis for functions as 
diverse as weather forecasting, navigation, communications, and search-and-
rescue operations.”269 The space community needs to adopt a legal regime 
that enables the development of technology to remediate the space 
environment now before a catastrophic event occurs.  
Currently sixty actors utilize space, predominately by using satellites.270  
However, only ten have independent orbital launch capability, of which only 
five regularly launch spacecraft belonging to other states.271  This limited 
group of actors with independent launch capabilities holds significant power 
and control over the space community.  Specifically, this class has the 
potential to wield effective market power in the space industry.  Such power 
enables these actors to develop and impose a system that forces players in the 
space community to financially contribute to remediating the space 
environment.  The states that dominate the launch market, Russia, the U.S., 
the ESA, China, and India, need to implement a multilateral agreement that 
provides for the imposition of a fee for every launch.  Proceeds will fund 
development of technology to remediate the space environment.  This is the 
only feasible solution because (1) individual states and consortia either 
cannot, or will not, develop remediation techniques on their own, (2) the 
space community as a whole will not be able to reach a voluntary consensus 
on paying into a fund to design remediation techniques, and (3) market 
power is the sole means of control within the space community.  
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